One of the many responses to the ever-evolving challenges facing occupational safety and health professionals over the past decades is the theory of Behavior Based Safety (BBS). Unlike traditional safety systems that focus on management, engineers, and safety professionals as responsible owners of safety within an organization, BBS shifts that focus of responsibility to an organization's workforce. In other words, BBS theorizes that frequencies of illness and injury can be decreased through modification of worker behaviors (Boyce & Roman, 2002), and that such modification be accomplished by focusing management attention on unsafe acts committed by workers. However, despite widespread implementation of Behavior Based Safety initiatives over the past two decades, a safety system based on the common culture of BBS is one based on inherent flaws that predispose the organization to failure in terms of safety.
Sweeping Acceptance
Safety consultants in the United States were well positioned to fill a void created by a sharp decrease in the number of new OSHA edicts in the mid-1990s, and many of them proposed Behavior Based Safety to their clients, who themselves were well positioned for such contracts due to the favorable economic condition of the decade (What Happened, 2002). The influx of BBS initiatives throughout the country created a wave of acceptance due to the fact that so many organizations were embracing the theory. So much so, in fact, that U.S. health and safety agencies not only seemed to turn a blind eye, but also provided support in many cases (Frederick & Lessin, 2000). For instance, there is evidence to suggest that at one point OSHA may have been requiring BBS as a Voluntary Protection Program criterion, and that NIOSH was also involved in expanding the wave of BBS acceptance and implementation (Frederick & Lessin, 2000). In a November 2000 Multinational Monitor article, James Frederick and Nancy Lessin stated that “NIOSH has awarded research grants, studying the impacts of Behavior Based Safety, to the very consultants who market and sell the BBS programs” (Frederick & Lessin, 2000, p.7).
Widespread Reality
For all of the approval BBS garnered in the 1990s, much of which still exists today, a 2002 poll conducted of American Society of Safety Engineer (ASSE) chapter presidents revealed that, in their opinion, BBS will decline in practice due to a lack of proof for its effectiveness (What Happened, 2002).
Understanding why Behavior Based Safety fails requires closer inspection of its inherent flaws.
Although safety systems involving BBS vary from one organization to another, at the core of each is the theory that unsafe acts committed by workers are the primary causes of accidents and injuries (Topf, 2002). The result of such a safety perspective leads to a responsibility shift away from foremen and supervisors (Questions, 2002), as well as an atmosphere of fear in an organization where workers are reluctant to report incidents for fear of labeling and punishment (Frederick & Lessin, 2000). The following example illustrates the atmosphere of fear reality:
“At one factory that had implemented a behavioral safety program, the United Auto Workers Health and Safety Department reports, when a union representative asked workers during shift meetings to raise their hands if they were afraid to report injuries, about half of 150 workers raised their hands. Worried that some workers feared even raising their hand in response to the question, the union representative asked a subsequent group to write “yes” on a piece of paper if they were afraid to report injuries. Seventy percent indicated they were afraid to report injuries. Asked why they would not report injuries, workers said, “we know that we will face an inquisition,” “we would be humiliated” and “we might be blamed for the injury” (Frederick & Lessin, 2000, p.3).
To further highlight how significant the flaws of BBS truly are, one need not look further than the core of all BBS programs, which, as stated above, is based on the presumption that unsafe acts committed by workers are the primary causes of incidents. To be more specific, BBS proponents typically assert that such unsafe acts are responsible for approximately 85% of all incidents (Frederick & Lessin, 2000). However, these presumptions are based on 1930s research conducted by insurance investigator H.W. Heimrich, which consisted of accident report reviews (Frederick & Lessin, 2000). Because the accident reports Heimrich reviewed were creations of management, it is not difficult to understand why workers were found to be at fault 85% of the time. Moreover, by his own admission in June of 2000 at a conference held by the ASSE, noted safety consultant and BBS advocate Dr. Thomas R. Krause stated that “the situation in which the injury is actually caused by the worker, while existent, is extremely rare” (Manuele, 2000, p.3).
In addition to the comments made by Dr. Krause that refute the very tenet on which BBS was designed so many years ago, Fred A. Manuele suggests that other BBS experts “1.) Promote the principle offered by W. Edwards Deming that performance does not come from the individual… but the system, and 2.) Recognize that the principle focus for safety improvement should not be on the psychology of correcting worker behavior; rather, the focus should be on the design of the workplace, the work methods, and the management system” (Manuele, 2000, p.1).
Conclusion
The wave of Behavior Based Safety created by consultants in the 1990s crested amid high industry optimism and consultant profits, and is now crashing amid a lack of proof for its effectiveness. As current programs continue to divide workers and management, consultants are scrambling to redefine BBS in terms of concepts that provide understanding, partnership, and success (What Happened, 2002). Whether such reinventions of the theory will ever be realized remains to be seen, but current approaches of BBS are best described by Frederick and Nancy Lessin:
“The blame-the-worker approach of behavior-based safety programs is incompatible with, and designed to represent an alternative to, efforts — including those mandated by law — to identify and eliminate or reduce the hazards responsible for the epidemic of worker injuries, illness and death” ((Frederick & Lessin, 2000, p.8).
Reference List:
Boyce, T., & Roman, H. (2002). Institutionalizing behavior-based safety: theories, concepts, and practical suggestions. The Behavior Analyst Today 3.1 (Wntr 2002): p76(7). Retrieved from General OneFile.
Frederick, J., & Lessin, N. (2000). Blame the worker: The rise of behavioral-based safety programs. Multinational Monitor 21.11 (Nov 2000): p10. Retrieved from General OneFile.
Manuele, F. (2000). Behavioral safety: looking beyond the worker. Occupational Hazards 62.10 (Oct 2000): p86. Retrieved from General OneFile.
Topf, M. (2002). Behavioral safety: a necessary part of the whole. Occupational Hazards 64.9 (Sept 2002): p59(5). Retrieved from General OneFile.
Questions & Answers, (Whether behavior-based occupational safety places too much focus on employees). Industrial Safety & Hygiene News 36.10 (Oct 2002): p6(3). Retrieved from General OneFile.
What Happened to the “behavior” buzz? (behavioral safety as a component in occupational safety and health). Industrial Safety & Hygiene News 36.10 (Oct 2002): p30(2). Retrieved from General OneFile.
Management | Admin, 25 Jan 10 | 
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